Superseniority for Minority Workers - Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc. by Glick, Robert
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 26 
Issue 1 Fall 1976 Article 10 
Superseniority for Minority Workers - Franks v. Bowman 
Transportation Co., Inc. 
Robert Glick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Robert Glick, Superseniority for Minority Workers - Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 26 DePaul 
L. Rev. 158 (1976) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol26/iss1/10 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
SUPERSENIORITY FOR MINORITY WORKERS-
FRANKS V. BOWMAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
The recent economic recession has focused widespread attention on
the alleged conflict between the equal employment opportunity laws
and the continued use of seniority in allocating scarce employment
rights and benefits. It has been argued by some commentators that the
allocation of employment rights and benefits on the basis of seniority is
a discriminatory practice, in that due to their past exclusion from the
workforce, women and minorities have been unable to accumulate suffi-
cient seniority to compete with incumbent employees.' The availability
of seniority remedies under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 2 has
been the subject of considerable controversy, particularly in view of
§703(h),3 which protects the operations of bona fide seniority systems.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc.,4 the Supreme Court had
its first opportunity to examine the seniority provisions of §703(h). The
Court held that §703(h) does not bar grants of fictional seniority, retro-
active to the date of employment application, to minority workers who
are the victims of an illegal, post-Act discriminatory refusal to hire.
Additionally, the Court held this granting of application date seniority
to be virtually mandated in most cases by the central statutory purposes
of Title VII.
The Bowman decision is subject to criticism in that the constructive
seniority remedy penalizes not only the wrongdoing employer, but also
the perfectly innocent incumbent employees. This Note will point out,
however, that the constructive remedy will be available only in a
somewhat limited number of situations. It will be demonstrated that
1. See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598,
1602-37 (1969); Note, Layoffs and Title VII: The Conflict Between Seniority and Equal
Employment Opportunities, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 791. But see Note, The Survival of "Last
Hired, First Fired" Under Title VII and Section 1981, 6 LoYOLA (Chi.) L.J. 386 (1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (1970), as amended.
3. Id. §2000e-2(h), which provides, in relevant part:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in
different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. ...
4. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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Title VII affords no remedy to the plaintiff who fails to prove that he or
she has been the victim of individual, post-Act discrimination, and that
the Bowman decision cannot be used as a basis for abandoning seniority
based layoffs. Furthermore, it will be shown that incumbent employees
might intervene in Title VII actions so as to protect their own interests,
insofar as possible, under the Bowman decision.
FACTS
Bowman Transportation Co. is an interstate trucking firm with ter-
minals scattered throughout the South. Until September of 1970, Bow-
man pursued an unwritten policy of refusing to hire blacks as over-the-
road (OTR) drivers.' Petitioner Johnny Lee originally applied for an
OTR job with Bowman in January of 1970. Although he had an excellent
driving record and seven years experience, he was not hired. Upon hear-
ing that Bowman had hired a white driver shortly after his rejection,
petitioner filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). Lee was thereafter hired in September of 1970,
but was discharged in March 1971. He then filed another complaint
with the EEOC, which authorized petitioner to commence Title VII
actions with respect to both the allegedly discriminatory refusal to hire
and the discharge.
The district court certified the action as a proper class action and
found that Lee represented all black applicants who sought to be hired
or who sought transfer to OTR positions prior to January 1, 1972.1 In its
final order, the court subdivided the class represented by Lee into two
classes; one consisting of black nonemployee applicants for OTR posi-
tions, and another consisting of black employees who had applied for
transfer to OTR positions. The court enjoined Bowman from perpetuat-
5. Prior to 1968, Bowman pursued a conscious policy of segregating its employees by
race. Blacks were employed primarily in the Tire Shop, which contained the most menial
and lowest paying jobs. (There were, however, two blacks employed as "cleanup men" in
the Trailer Shop.) Despite a 1967 collective bargaining agreement in which Bowman
agreed to allow transfers and to hire without regard to race, it largely continued its
discriminatory policies in the years following. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 495
F.2d 398, 409-11 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
6. Petitioner had been discharged pursuant to a longstanding company policy requiring
mandatory discharge of an employee whose fuel pump had been tampered with. Lee had
been found with a "stinger" (a wooden peg used to override the engine's governor) in the
fuel pump of his engine. The district court later found that Lee's discharge had not been
the result of racial discrimination. Id. at 406-07.
7. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., (unreported, N.D. Ga., June 29, 1972). The
district court's opinion may be found in the Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at A45, Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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ing discriminatory practices found to exist. However, it denied certain
specific relief sought by members of both classes, including seniority
retroactive to the date of application for an OTR position."
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the judgment was
reversed insofar as it failed to grant seniority relief to the class of em-
ployee plaintiffs.' However, the court affirmed the denial of seniority
relief to the nonemployee plaintiffs. 0 It was on this issue that petitioners
appealed to the Supreme Court.
THE COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals
denying seniority relief to nonemployee discriminatees. Justice Bren-
nan, speaking for a five man majority, delivered the opinion of the
Court. He labeled as "clearly erroneous" the holding of the appellate
court that §703(h) protects the differences in benefits and conditions of
employment which a seniority system accords to older and newer em-
ployees in the face of a discriminatory refusal to hire."
Examining the language and legislative history of §703(h), 2 the Court
8. Id. at A54.
9. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 495 F.2d 398, 417 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. Id. at 417-18. The court felt that a grant of fictional seniority was barred by §703(h).
11. 424 U.S. at 757.
12. As originally enacted by the House of Representatives, Title VII contained no ex-
press reference to seniority systems. The original bill touched off a flood of national
concern that it would require employers to maintain racial balance in their work forces,
and would destroy the seniority rights of white employees. A three month filibuster, led
by Senator Hill of Alabama, began in the Senate. In order to allay the fears that Title
VII would destroy seniority rights, the Senate floor managers of the bill, Senators Clark
and Case, introduced three interpretative memoranda into the record. The first of these
was prepared by the Department of Justice, and asserted that Title VII would have no
effect on vested seniority rights, even where blacks had been prevented from accruing
seniority due to employer discrimination in previous years. The Justice Department mem-
orandum stated, in part:
Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes
effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event
of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would
not be affected in the least by title VII. This would be true even in the case where
owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had
more seniority than Negroes. Title VII is directed at discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a
worker is laid off or denied a chance for promotion because under established
seniority rules he is "low man on the totem pole" he is not being discriminated
against because of his race.
110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964). The second memorandum submitted by Senators Clark and
Case stated:
[Vol. 26:158
19761 FRANKS v. BOWMAN
concluded that §703(h) is a definitional provision, 3 delineating which
employment practices are illegal when the post-Act operation of a sen-
iority system is challenged on the grounds that it perpetuates the effects
of pre-Act discrimination. The Court found no indication that §703(h)
was intended to modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once a
post-Act discriminatory practice, 4 such as the discriminatory refusal to
hire in the present case, is proven. 5 Thus, the Court concluded that
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is pro-
spective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been dis-
criminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the
title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future
vacancies on a non-discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed,
permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future
vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at
the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
Id. at 7213. The third memorandum submitted by Senator Clark came in the form of a
written answer to one of several questions proffered by Senator Dirksen relating to the
scope and meaning of the bill. The question and answer were as follows:
Question: Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions, when
that management function is governed by a labor contract calling for promotions
on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally, labor contracts call for
"last hired, first fired." If the last hired are Negroes, is the employer discrimi-
nating if his contract requires they be first fired and the remaining employees
are white?
Answer: Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last
hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired," he can still
be "first fired" as long as it is done because of his status as "last hired" and
not because of his race.
Id. at 7217. Despite these efforts to allay the fears of the opposition, it became necessary
to include explicit language on the questions of seniority and racial balance in order to
end the filibuster. Thus, §703(h) was introduced on the seniority question. See note 3
supra. On the question of racial balance and reverse discrimination, the present §703(j),
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) (1970), was introduced to provide that no employer should be re-
quired to grant preferential treatment to any individual in order to correct a racial imbal-
ance in that employer's workforce. The bill, as amended by these and other sections, which
was known as the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, was then enacted into law.
13. That is, its purpose is to define what is and what is not an unlawful employment
practice under certain circumstances.
14. However, this post-Act discriminatory practice should not be based upon the pres-
ent application of a facially neutral, bona fide seniority system. But see note 61 infra.
15. 424 U.S. at 762. In its consideration of the legislative history, the Court evidently
rejected appellant's contention that any controlling force of the Clark-Case memoranda,
supra note 12, was rendered null by the subsequent enactment of §703(h). Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 7, at 28. See also Cooper & Sobol, supra note 1, at 1613. This contention
also is discredited by the legislative history itself, in the comments of Senator Humphrey,
a strong supporter of the bill. Senator Humphrey explained that the Senate amendments
to Title VII had merely been added "to remove certain ambiguities and uncertainties
which existed in the House text," 110 CONG. REC. 12575 (1964), and explained that:
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§703(h) is not, as a matter of law, a bar to the award of retroactive
seniority in a case where such relief is otherwise appropriate."6
Having decided that seniority relief was not barred by §703(h), the
Court then moved to the question of whether such relief is appropriate
under §706(g), 7 the remedial provision of the Act. Noting the "make
whole" purpose of Title VIP and the "rightful place" objective of the
relief accorded thereunder," the Court felt that adequate relief would
be denied petitioners absent a grant of application date seniority.2'" It
The basic coverage and the substantive prohibitions of the title remain un-
changed . . . [Nior have there been any significant changes in the sections
specifying what actions constitute unlawful employment practices.
Id. at 12721. Speaking specifically of §703(h), Senator Humphrey stated that "The change
does not narrow the application of the title, but merely clarifies its present intent and
effect." Id. at 12723.
16. 424 U.S. at 762.
17. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) provides:
(g) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or
labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment
practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay
liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a
charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reason-
able diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to
reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the
admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the
payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission,
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 704(a).
18. Quoting from the Conference Report on the 1972 amendments to §706(g), the Court
stated that:
[Tihe Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful employment discrimina-
tion whole and . . . the attainment of this objective . . . requires that persons
aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practices
be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it
not for the unlawful discrimination.
424 U.S. at 764, quoting 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972).
19. Id. at 764 n.21. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text infra.
20. Id. at 764-65. Justice Brennan elaborated on this point, stating that:
Without an award of seniority dating from the time at which he was discrimina-
torily refused employment, an individual who applies for and obtains employ-
ment as an OTR driver pursuant to the District Court's order will never obtain
his rightful place in the hierarchy of seniority according to which these various
FRANKS v. BOWMAN
therefore held that "[T]he denial of seniority relief to victims of illegal
racial discrimination in hiring is permissible 'only for reasons which, if
applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of
eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.' "2
Two specific arguments raised in support of the lower court's denial
of seniority relief then were refuted by the Court. The first was that an
award of retroactive seniority might benefit some individuals who were
not in fact the victims of racial discrimination. Justice Brennan, how-
ever, said that this concern would become material when such persons
reapply for OTR positions pursuant to the district court's order. At this
time, if Bowman is able to prove that the applicant was not actually the
victim of racial discrimination, it may deny such individual seniority
relief.22 The second argument in favor of the lower court's judgment was
that such relief, if granted, would interfere with the economic interests
of other, perfectly innocent employees. However, the Court was of the
opinion that a denial of seniority relief on this ground would, if applied
generally, frustrate the "make whole" objective of Title VII.22 Addition-
ally, the relief which petitioners sought did not constitute "complete
relief" in Justice Brennan's opinion, in that should an award of retroac-
tive seniority be granted, petitioners still would remain subordinated in
the employment hierarchy to a greater total number of employees than
would have been the case absent any illegal discrimination. Thus, the
retroactive seniority remedy, according to Justice Brennan, provides for
a division of the burden of the employer's past discrimination among the
discriminatees and incumbent employees. The Court thought this shar-
ing of the burden of past discrimination to be presumptively necessary.24
However, the holding of the Court, that retroactive seniority must be
employment benefits are distributed. He will perpetually remain subordinate to
persons who, but for the illegal discrimination, would have been in respect to
entitlement to these benefits his inferiors.
Id. at 767-68.
21. Id. at 771, quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
22. 424 U.S. at 772. Evidence which the Court indicated may prove lack of discrimina-
tion against a particular applicant would include "[elvidence of a lack of vacancies in
OTR positions at the time the individual application was filed, or evidence indicating the
individual's lack of qualification for the OTR positions-under nondiscriminatory stan-
dards actually applied by Bowman to individuals who were in fact hired .... Id. at 773
n.32.
23. Id. at 774.
24. Id. at 777. Although the Court held that seniority relief may not be denied "on the
abstract basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees," it may be denied "on
the basis of unusual adverse impact arising from facts and circumstances that would not
be generally found in Title VII cases." Id. at 779 n.41.
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granted notwithstanding its adverse impact upon the rights of innocent
employees, is a basis of criticism of the Court's decision.
ANALYSIS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
a. Criticism
In ruling that grants of retroactive, competitive-type 5 seniority to
the identifiable victims of post-Act hiring discrimination are required
in most cases, the Court virtually brushed aside the equitable con-
siderations that weigh in favor of protecting the seniority rights of
incumbent employees. Justice Brennan argued for the majority that a
grant of application date seniority does not constitute "complete re-
lief'"" because discriminatees remain subordinated in the employment
hierarchy to a greater total number of employees than would have been
the case in the absence of discrimination.27 While this is true in most
cases where seniority relief is granted to a number of victims, it is not
so when only one individual is involved. An individual plaintiff is made
entirely whole by an award of application date seniority and in this case,
the burden of the employer's past discrimination with regard to compet-
itive seniority rights falls wholly upon the incumbent employees.
This can best be demonstrated by the following example. Assume that
five incumbent employees are working for the defendant employer at the
time the plaintiff brings his suit. These five employees are: employee 1
who has a seniority date of January 1; employee 2 with a seniority date
of February 1; employee 3 with a seniority date of March 1; employee 4
with a seniority date of April 1; and employee 5 whose seniority date is
May 1. Plaintiff X upon proving that he applied for employment on
March 15, but was rejected due to his race, is given a seniority date of
25. "Competitive-type" seniority refers to the use of seniority credit to determine the
rights of an employee vis-A-vis his fellow employees, in regard to such issues as job assign-
ments, promotions, layoffs, and the like. "Benefit-type" seniority, on the other hand,
refers to the use of seniority credit to determine the level of fringe benefits awarded to all
workers, for example, length and time of vacations, pension rights, insurance coverage,
etc.
26. 424 U.S. at 777.
27. Id. at 776-77. In the dissenting portion of his opinion, Justice Powell criticizes this
argument for its "opacity" and its "misperception of the nature of Title VII relief." He
points out that specific relief under Title VII focuses upon the individual victim of dis-
crimination, and not upon some "class" of victims. Therefore, the question of whether or
not the remedy somehow "divides the burden" of past discrimination is not relevant.
Rather, the question for the district courts should be whether it is equitable to grant full
competitive seniority to the individual victim (thus granting him complete relief in Justice
Powell's view) despite the adverse impact upon all incumbents hired after the date of his
original application. Id. at 790 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 26:158
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March 15 and is therefore inserted between employees 3 and 4 in the
seniority hierarchy. Now assume that plaintiff Y comes along and proves
that he applied for employment on February 15, but also was rejected
due to his race. Y is therefore granted seniority retroactive to February
15, and is inserted between 2 and 3 in the seniority hierarchy. The
seniority hierarchy now stands as follows: 1, 2, Y, 3, X, 4, and 5. Since
it is possible that 3 may not have been hired had Y been hired at the
time of his application, it can be seen that there are now four employees
above plaintiff X, whereas in the absence of discrimination there may
have been only three. It can also be seen that the burden of the em-
ployer's past discrimination is borne by 3 and X who are each subordi-
nated to one additional employee, and by 4 and 5 who are each subordi-
nated to two additional employees. However, it can also be seen that
plaintiff Y has been made entirely whole by the award of application
date seniority.
However, regardless of whether the burden of past discrimination is
made to fall partially or wholly upon the incumbent employees, the
question remains whether it is equitable to place that burden upon the
perfectly innocent incumbents, 8 rather than upon the offending em-
ployer. Justice Burger, in his dissent, felt that a grant of retroactive
seniority relief could rarely, if ever, be equitable in view of its effect upon
wholly innocent employees. Rather, he argued that an award of "front
pay" to the discriminatee could replace the need for competitive-type
seniority relief. 9 Under this "front pay" concept, the newly hired discri-
minatee would be given an award of monetary damages designed to
compensate him for the injury he will suffer as a consequence of his lost
seniority. 0 A grant of "front pay" may be more equitable than competi-
tive seniority relief because it provides relief to the victim of unlawful
discrimination, while having no adverse impact upon the rights or ex-
28. It has been urged by some commentators that the seniority expectations of incum-
bent employees which have been acquired during a period of racial discrimination are
somehow illegitimate in that they result from past discrimination against others. There-
fore, these seniority rights should be ignored by the district courts. See Cooper & Sobol,
supra note 1, at 1605-06. Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion answers that:
Such reasoning is badly flawed. Absent some showing of collusion, the incum-
bent employee was not a party to the discrimination by the employer. Accept-
ance of the job when offered hardly makes one an accessory to a discriminatory
failure to hire someone else. Moreover, the incumbent's expectancy does not
result from discrimination against others, but is based on his own efforts and
satisfactory performance.
424 U.S. at 788-89 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
29. 424 U.S. at 781 (Burger, C.J.', dissenting).
30. Brief for the EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 27, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc.,
424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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pectations of innocent parties. Additionally, it places the burden of past
discrimination upon the shoulders of the guilty party, the employer. :'
Justice Powell, also dissenting, argued that the majority's decision
strips the district courts of their statutory equitable powers. :2 Justice
Powell concluded that under §706(g), Congress gave the district courts
the power, in fashioning a remedy, to consider the impact of that remedy
upon incumbent employees, and to weigh the equities involved.": He
pointed to the opinion of the Sixth Circuit in Meadows v. Ford Motor
Co. ,"' which held that although retroactive seniority relief was not
barred by § 703(h), the district court should consider its impact upon
incumbent employees and upon the employer before granting such re-
lief.3 5 Additionally, the Meadows court held that representatives of the
31. With regard to "benefit-type" seniority, however, the situation is different than
that applying to "competitive-type" seniority. When retroactive benefit-type seniority is
granted, the burden of past discrimination falls precisely where it should-upon the em-
ployer, the perpetrator of the discriminatory act, and not upon the innocent party. Thus,
a grant of retroactive benefit-type seniority would normally be equitable to all parties
involved.
32. 424 U.S. at 786 (Powell, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 785-86 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell pointed to the specific language
of §706(g), which provides that the court may order "such affirmative action as may be
appropriate," and such "equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." Id. at 786. He
maintained that although a grant of constructive seniority is a remedy which is available
under §706(g), such a remedy is not always appropriate. Id. at 794 n.14.
34. 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. May 24, 1976).
35. The Meadows court stated:
Whatever the difficulties of determining back pay awards, the award of retro-
active job seniority offers still greater problems ...
[Wihere the burden of retroactive pay falls upon the party which violated
the law, the burden of retroactive seniority for determination of layoff would fall
directly upon other workers who have themselves had no hand in the wrongdoing
found by the District Court.
There is, however, no prohibition to be found in the statute we construe in
this case which prohibits retroactive seniority and, of course, the remedy for the
wrong of discriminatory refusal to hire lies in the first instance with the District
Judge. For his guidance on this issue we observe, however, that a grant of
retroactive seniority would not depend solely upon a record sufficient to justify
back pay. .-. . The court would, in dealing with job seniority, need also to
consider the interests of the workers who might be displaced as well as the
interests of the employer in retaining an experienced workforce. We do not
assume . . . that such reconciliation is impossible, but as is obvious, we cer-
tainly do foresee genuine difficulties.
510 F.2d at 948-49. But see Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973), in which the court ordered
the granting of seniority relief from the date of the unlawful employment practice to the
date of reinstatement without any discussion of the impact of §703(h) or the equitable
considerations involved.
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incumbent employees should be allowed to protect their interests by
intervening in the action before the district court.3"
b. Protection of Incumbents' Rights Through Intervention
As Justice Burger also stressed in his dissent, the decision of the
majority did not foreclose the right of employees who might be injured
by a grant of competitive seniority to petition the district court for
equitable relief in their own behalf.37 While Bowman has stripped the
district courts of most of their equitable discretion to withhold seniority
relief, they still retain the power to grant equitable relief to incumbent
employees. Thus, incumbent employees hired after the discriminatee's
original rejection, but before their ultimate hiring, could seek an injunc-
tion holding themselves harmless against any losses they might suffer
due to their lost seniority status.3" In a layoff situation, the employer
would therefore be required to pay the full salaries of those employees
who, but for their displacement in the seniority system by discrimina-
tees, would not have been laid off. The practical effect of this proposal,
for a large employer, would be that such incumbent employees would
actually remain at work, since an employer generally finds work for
those he must pay. 39 However, a small employer who must lay off em-
ployees often has problems meeting current monetary obligations. A
court order to pay full salaries to employees who were laid off may result
in additional layoffs or other cutbacks to avoid a fiscal crisis. This type
of remedy is not equitable when directed against an employer who is
struggling to remain solvent.
Alternatively, incumbent employees could petition the district court
for an award of monetary damages or "front pay" for each employee
bearing part of the burden of the employer's past discrimination. The
court could also order a combination of the above two types of relief; for
example, a hold harmless injunction to protect the affected incumbents
in a layoff situation, and front pay as compensation for a possible future
loss of promotion to a newly placed discriminatee with constructively
36. 510 F.2d at 949. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
37. 424 U.S. at 781 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 777 n.38 (majority opinion). This remedy was proposed by the United Auto
Workers in their brief as Amicus Curiae, at 3-11, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc.,
424 U.S. 747 (1976).
39. Since the number of discriminatees who actually take advantage of an award of
class-based relief is usually small, the application of this proposal would not place an
undue financial burden upon the employer. For example, of the 166 rejected Negro appli-
cations placed into evidence in the Bowman case, only about 5-7 individuals were actually
hired pursuant to the district court's order. 424 U.S. at 776 n.36.
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greater seniority.4 However, such a monetary award again would work
a hardship on the employer who is struggling to keep the business going.
The trial court must then balance the competing interests and tailor a
remedy to fit each individual situation.
c. Restrictions Upon the Remedy
The decision in Bowman, however, is not as broad as it first might
appear. It is apparent that the Court has placed several restrictions
upon the circumstances in which relief may be granted. First, the Court
has limited the class of persons to whom seniority relief may be granted
to those who are the individual, identifiable victims of post-Act discrim-
ination." Thus, superseniority may not be granted to a plaintiff who has
suffered no individual discrimination; nor may such relief be granted to
one who has suffered pre-Act but not post-Act hiring discrimination."
This confirms the results reached in two prior Title VII cases, Waters
v. Wisconsin Steelworks," and Watkins v. United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, Local 2369,11 both of which involved the effects of Title VII upon
seniority based layoffs. In the Watkins case, black workers, threatened
by a seniority based layoff which would have virtually eliminated blacks
from the workforce, were held to have no cause of action under Title VII
because no individual member of the plaintiff class had been a victim
40. Id. at 777 n.38.
41. Quoting from the legislative history of Title VII, the Court indicated that the senior-
ity rights of incumbent employees which vested prior to the effective date of the Act could
not be altered, regardless of the employer's past history of discrimination. 424 U.S. at
759-60. See also note 12 supra. However, the Court held that §703(h) was not intended
to "modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory practice
occurring after the effective date of the Act is proved .. " 424 U.S. at 761-62. There-
fore, it can be seen that seniority relief would be available only to the victims of post-Act
discrimination.
The Court indicated that seniority relief, as any other relief under Title VII, would be
available only to identifiable victims of discrimination; id. at 771, 774, 779; and stated
that if respondent could prove that particular persons were not in fact victims of racial
discrimination, retroactive seniority relief could be denied these particular class members.
Id. at 773. See note 22 supra.
42. The Second Circuit, in Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976), held that
retroactive seniority would' be available to one who has suffered pre-Title VII hiring dis-
crimination, but has subsequently been hired some years after the effective date of the
Act. Id. at 657 (Kaufman, J., concurring). However, in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Bowman that seniority rights vesting prior to the effective date of Title VII
cannot be altered, see note 41 supra, relief will no longer be available to pre-Act discrimi-
natees.
43. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. May 24, 1976).
44. 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
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of the employer's past discrimination."5 In Waters, it was held that a
black who had been refused employment but later hired in pre-Title VII
years could not challenge the seniority system under which he subse-
quently was laid off.4"
A second limitation of the remedy is derived from the Court's conclu-
sion that the operation of a bona fide47 seniority system may not be
attacked as a present discriminatory practice because it perpetuates the
45. Id. at 45. The court stated that:
To hold the seniority plan discriminatory as to the plaintiffs in this case
requires a determination that blacks not otherwise personally discriminated
against should be treated preferentially over equal whites. . . . The result
which plaintiffs seek, therefore, is not that personal immediate relief available
under Title VII, but rather a preferential treatment on the basis of race which
Congress specifically prohibited in Section 703(j).
Id. at 46. The court went on to hold that in light of §703(h), the use of employment
seniority to determine the layoffs of plaintiffs could not constitute an unlawful employ-
ment practice. Id. at 46-49.
46. Relying upon the legislative history of §703(h), the court concluded that a last hired,
first fired seniority system is not of itself racially discriminatory, nor does it have the effect
of perpetuating the effects of past discrimination in violation of Title VII. Speaking upon
the latter point, the court stated:
Title VII speaks only to the future. Its backward gaze is found only on a
present practice which may perpetuate past discrimination. An employment
seniority system embodying the "last hired, first fired" principle does not of
itself perpetuate past discrimination. To hold otherwise would be tantamount
to shackling white employees with a burden of a past discrimination created not
by them but by their employer. Title VII was not designed to nurture such
reverse discriminatory preferences.
502 F.2d at 1320.
47. Although the term "bona fide" is not defined in the legislative history, it was
probably used to insure that a seniority system which is being used as a mere cloak for
discrimination should not be given protection under the Act. Such a construction would
be in accord with the definition of the term given in Black's Law Dictionary: "In or with
good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 223 (4th ed. 1968).
In Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975),
rev'd sub nom., EEOC v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. May
24, 1976), the court held that in order to impeach the "bona fides" of a seniority system,
plaintiffs must present "evidence directed either to the neutrality of the system or evi-
dence directed to ascertaining an intent to disguise discrimination." 508 F.2d at 706. It
has been argued that a seniority system which had its genesis in a period of racial discrimi-
nation cannot be bona fide. This contention was specifically rejected in Waters v. Wiscon-
sin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. May
24, 1976). See note 46 and accompanying text supra. Employment seniority systems
embodying the "last hired, first fired" principle have been found to be "bona fide" senior-
ity systems under §703(h). Waters, supra at 1318; Jersey Central, supra at 710; Watkins
v. United Steelworkers of America, 516 F.2d 41, 49 (5th Cir. 1975). See note 38 and
accompanying text supra.
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effects of an employer's pre-Act discrimination against minorities.'"
Thus, it may no longer be argued, as it was argued by plaintiffs in the
Watkins case, that a seniority based layoff is a present discriminatory
practice where the employer's pre-Act discrimination has prevented
minorities as a class from acquiring sufficient seniority to withstand
layoff." It of course follows that superseniority may not be granted solely
to prevent minority group members from being laid off in the above
situation."
The third limitation upon the remedy also would prohibit supersen-
iority from being used as a tool to prevent minority workers from losing
their jobs in a seniority based layoff. The Court has indicated that
"rightful place" is the proper theory of relief to be applied under Title
VII' Under the "rightful place" theory, the worker is entitled to that
place in the seniority system which he would have occupied absent the
illegal discrimination. However, incumbent employees are not to be
displaced from their present jobs by minority workers even though those
minority workers, absent discrimination, would have occupied certain
jobs now held by incumbents.2 In other words, a discriminatee may
bump an incumbent down one rung on the seniority ladder, but will not
bump him from his present job. Thus, it can be seen that constructive
seniority will not be available solely to prevent a seniority based layoff
from disproportionately affecting newly hired women and minority
48. 424 U.S. at 757-62, 781 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. In Watkins, the district court accepted this contention, holding that the last hired,
first fired layoff perpetuated the effects of the employer's past discrimination against
blacks. Watkins v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 2369, 369 F.Supp. 1221, 1226
(E.D. La. 1974). The Fifth Circuit reversed on this point, see note 45 and accompanying
text supra, and also held that the seniority system was protected by §703(h). Watkins v.
United Steelworkers of America, Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41, 46-49 (5th Cir. 1975).
50. It also should be noted here, as discussed in notes 41-46 and accompanying text
supra, that although a last hired, first fired layoff would not be an unlawful employment
practice even in the face of post-Act hiring discrimination, those employees who had
themselves been the identifiable victims of such post-Act hiring discrimination might be
eligible for seniority relief under Bowman. See note 54 infra.
51. 424 U.S. at 764 n.21.
The reports of both Houses of Congress indicated that "rightful place" was the
intended objective of Title VII and the relief accorded thereunder. ...
[Rlightful place seniority, implicating an employee's future earnings, job secu-
rity and advancement prospects, is absolutely essential to obtaining this con-
gressionally mandated goal.
Id. The "rightful place" analysis was first developed in Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimi-
nation and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1260 (1967).
52. Thus, the seniority credit awarded to discriminatees may be used in bidding for
present and future job vacancies only. See Note, supra note 51.
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workers." To grant such relief would be to allow workers who themselves
had suffered no discrimination54 to attain greater than their rightful
places in the seniority hierarchy, at the expense of the incumbents. This
would be contrary not only to the rightful place objective, but also to
the Court's decision that seniority relief should be available only to the
individual victims of unlawful discrimination.55
Finally, the Court in Bowman held that the rightful place objective
requires the granting of seniority relief retroactive only to the discrimi-
natee's date of employment application." Seniority may not be made
retroactive to any date earlier than that of the employment application
because prior to this date, the employer has not discriminated against
the individual plaintiff.7 While it may be true that an individual victim
did not file his application at an earlier date because he knew that
members of his race were not hired by defendant employer, the seniority
rights of incumbent employees should not be altered in the absence of
actual, individual discrimination against the plaintiff at this earlier
date.
The Ninth Circuit recognized this limitation upon Bowman in Jones
v. Pacific Intermountain Express, Inc.5" In that case, minority job appli-
cants sought seniority retroactive to the date they first thought of apply-
53. Several lower courts have held that a reverse seniority layoff constitutes an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII when such a layoff affects minority group employees
in disproportionate numbers. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 10 FEP Cases 1023
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976) (initially decided under 42 U.S.C.
§1981; reversed on Title VII grounds); Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F.Supp. 1136 (E.D. Mich.
1975). Although Chance was reversed on appeal, Schaefer was not appealed. However, in
light of the holding of Bowman, the Schaefer decision and decisions in similar cases can
no longer stand.
54. Of course, if the employee facing layoff were himself a victim of post-Act hiring
discrimination, he would be eligible for seniority relief under the Bowman decision if his
complaint regarding the illegal refusal to hire had been brought before the EEOC within
180 days of the alleged hiring discrimination. See Title VII, §706(e), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
5(e) (Supp. IV, 1974). Such relief would be based upon the fact that the employee is
entitled under Bowman to be made whole from the effects of the hiring discrimination
rather than upon any discriminatory impact of the seniority system.
55. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra.
56. 424 U.S. at 767.
57. Prior to Bowman, in Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976), the court implied
that a member of the plaintiff class (female police officers threatened by a last hired, first
fired layoff) would be entitled to constructive seniority dating from the time at which she
first complained of defendant's discriminatory hiring policy, or expressed a desire to join
the police department, but was deterred from doing so by defendant's policy barring
women. Id. at 656. However, in light of Bowman, retroactive seniority can no longer be
made to predate the actual date of application.
58. 536 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1976).
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ing for the positions but failed to do so. The Ninth Circuit held, how-
ever, that any relief to which the plaintiffs might be entitled under
Bowman "would date back only to the time the plaintiffs submitted
their applications for employment to employer defendants.""
CONCLUSION
Although it is desirable to make persons whole, insofar as possible,
from the effects of illegal racial discrimination, the Supreme Court in
Bowman went too far when it declared that competitive-type seniority
must be granted in virtually every case. Unlike benefit-type seniority,
which should in all cases be granted, 0 a grant of competitive seniority
interferes with the rights of innocent employees. The burden of "making
whole" for the discriminatory act should fall entirely upon the wrong-
doer, and not upon innocent parties. Thus, the interests of doing equity
to all parties concerned would be better served by a grant of "front pay,"
rather than competitive seniority, to the discriminatee.
The Court's decision in Bowman is not as broad as might first appear,
however. It does not give the district courts license to use superseniority
as a cure for all the supposed evils and inequities inherent in a seniority
system. The circumstances in which a grant of constructive seniority
under Bowman would be available are somewhat limited. First, the
remedy would be available only to the individual victims of post-Act
discrimination. Second, constructive seniority may not be awarded to
minority group members solely to prevent their layoff in a last hired,
first fired situation. Third, the discriminatee is entitled only to be in-
serted in his "rightful place" in the seniority system: that place in the
employment hierarchy which he would have occupied absent unlawful
discrimination against him. Finally, the constructive seniority granted
cannot predate the application date of the discriminatee.
Under the Bowman decision, incumbent employees will be forced to
intervene in Title VII actions if they wish to protect their own rights.
59. Id. at 819.
60. See note 31 supra.
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Considering the impact of the constructive seniority remedy upon inno-
cent incumbents, courts should not engage in unwarranted extentions
of the Bowman decision."'
Robert Glick
61. It can be argued that the Bowman decision has been extended by a recent Seventh
Circuit case. In Evans v. United Airlines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1976), plaintiff, a stewardess, had been discriminatorily
discharged in 1968. She was rehired as a new employee with a new seniority date in 1972,
and in 1973, more than five years after the wrongful discharge, she filed a complaint with
the EEOC. Plaintiff admitted that her claim of wrongful discharge was barred by the
statute of limitations. However, she alleged that the operation of United's admittedly
facially neutral seniority system perpetuated the effects of that discharge and was there-
fore a present discriminatory practice. The court agreed; holding that under Bowman, the
present application of a seniority plan which perpetuates the effects of a prior wrongful
discharge is a discriminatory practice. Id. at 1250-51. However, in Bowman, the Supreme
Court stressed that the underlying wrong affecting plaintiffs was not the operation of a
discriminatory seniority system, but was rather a discriminatory refusal to hire. 96 S.Ct.
at 1261. The question of whether an unlawful employment practice may be founded upon
the continuing application of an admittedly facially neutral seniority system was not at
issue in Bowman. Id. It may be argued, therefore, that Evans extended the rationale of
Bowman to hold that even the operation of a facially neutral seniority system may be
found to be a discriminatory practice. The Evans decision is contrary to the specific
language of §703(h). The error of this decision is that the plaintiff's claim for seniority
relief had lapsed with the passage of the statute of limitations, barring her claim for the
wrongful discharge. The subsequent application of the seniority system, applying equally
to plaintiff and all other new employees, should have been held to be protected under the
explicit language of §703(h).
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